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Program and Nonprogram Wheat Acreage
Responses  to Prices and Risk
Mark A. Krause, Jung-Hee Lee, and Won W. Koo
Wheat acreage  responses to expected wheat price  and price risk are reversed for program-
and nonprogram-planted  acreage  in the northern  plains, central  plains, southern plains, and
U.S.  Expected  wheat  price  has  a  strong  negative  effect  on  program-complying  wheat
acreage.  Government  support  prices  have  a  positive  effect  on  program-complying  and
program-planted  acreage.  Price  risk  has  a positive  effect on  program-complying  wheat
acreage  and a negative  effect on  nonprogram-planted  acreage.  Estimated price  elasticities
are higher than in studies where  risk was  ignored.
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Introduction
Estimates of acreage response to changes in prices and government programs are important
parameters  in many agricultural  policy analyses.  Reliable  acreage  response estimates are
particularly  important  when  predicting  the  impacts  of changing  trade  policies  on U.S.
agricultural  markets.  Previous  analyses  of wheat acreage  response (Bailey  and Womack;
Burt and Worthington;  Chembezi  and Womack; Houck et al.; Just; Morzuch,  Weaver, and
Helmberger) have produced a wide range of price elasticity estimates.  The range of results
is largely due to the variety of ways that expected market prices, government support prices,
and  other government  program  parameters  have  been modeled;  although,  different  time
periods,  levels of data aggregation,  and  estimation  methods  also have contributed.  Most
analyses of wheat acreage response have ignored price risk, despite evidence that risk affects
acreage  of other  crops  (Chavas  and  Holt;  Brorsen  et  al.;  Traill).  Furthermore,  with  the
exception of Chembezi and Womack, previous analyses have not addressed possible differ-
ences between wheat program acreage responses and nonprogram acreage responses.
Chembezi and Womack establish an economic rationale for estimating program acreage
response separate from nonprogram acreage response. Their results indicate that although a
support price variable'  has a strong positive effect on program-planted acres, the expected
market price for wheat has a negative effect on program-planted  acres and a positive effect
on  nonprogram-planted  acres.  The  price  effects  on  program-planted  acres of wheat  are
particularly important in the northern plains states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota,
and  Montana)  because  most  wheat  in  this  region  is  usually  planted  under  government
programs.  During the period  1966-92, an average of 84% of northern plains wheat acres,
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In place  of support or  target price,  Chembezi  and Womack use a "program  production-inducing  price"  which equals the
expected market price  plus the deficiency payment  or value of market certificates  weighted  by the ratio of program yield to
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74% of central plains (Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming)  wheat acres, and 60%
of southern plains (Oklahoma and Texas) wheat acres were planted under the wheat program
whenever acreage set-aside or acreage reduction provisions were in effect (Langley).2
Methods of incorporating  government  program parameters  in other acreage  response
analyses  have  varied.  Houck  et al.  constructed  effective  support rate  and diversion  rate
variables using multiple program parameters. Changes in the wheat programs were reflected
in  the  effective  support  and  diversion  rate  calculations.  Total  planted  acres  were  then
estimated as a function of the effective support rate, effective diversion payment, and lagged
market price. Just multiplied the support price by the proportion of program participation
and then estimated total planted acres as a function of adjusted-support price, an expected-
returns measure based on past prices and yields,  a risk measure  based on past prices and
yields, and the wheat allotment. Bailey and Womack  constructed simple effective support
price and diversion payment variables, but estimated total planted acres as a function of a
weighted average of the support and lagged regional market prices. Bailey and Womack also
included regional price risk variables, but did not find statistically significant effects for risk.
Morzuch,  Weaver,  and  Helmberger  split  the  data  into  two  parts:  years  that  quotalike
programs were in effect and years of more voluntary programs. Then they estimated separate
acreage  responses to futures market prices. Burt and Worthington  used a series of dummy
variables  to reflect  changes  in policy, then  estimated total planted  acres  as a function of
current and lagged market prices plus deficiency or certificate payments.
Previous studies have shown that wheat acreage responses vary by region, primarily due
to different classes of wheat, substitute crops, government program parameters, and produc-
tion costs in each region. Morzuch, Weaver, and Helmberger found the smallest elasticities
of acreage response to wheat price in the hard red winter (HRW) wheat states of the central
plains,  an intermediate  response for soft red winter (SRW)  wheat acreage  in the corn belt
states, and the greatest response  for hard red  spring (HRS) wheat acreage in the northern
plains states. Bailey and Womack  found that the elasticity of acreage response to expected
wheat price was  much higher  in the southeast and corn belt regions than  in the southern
plains, northern plains, and Northwest regions.  Burt and Worthington  found  much higher
long-run price elasticities  for wheat  acreage response in most of the northern plains states
than in central plains or southern plains states.
Among previous studies, only Just and Bailey and Womack considered the effects of risk
on wheat acreage response. Just found  negative and statistically significant effects of risk
on  wheat  acreage  in  two  California  counties.  The  coefficient  of risk was  negative  but
statistically insignificant  in the Bailey and Womack  study.  However,  Just and Bailey and
Womack combined  acreage planted  under government programs  and nonprogram-planted
acreage.  We  hypothesize  that  price  risk  encourages  wheat  planting  under  government
programs, but discourages  nonprogram wheat planting. The aggregate effect is difficult to
predict and may often be insignificant.
The objective of this study is to contrast regional and U.S. wheat acreage responses to
expected wheat price, expected price for competing crops, government program parameters,
and  risk.  Following  Chembezi  and  Womack,  this  study  separates  program-complying
acreage and program-planted acreage from nonprogram-planted acreage. This study departs
from Chembezi and Womack by considering the effect of price risk, changing the definition
of expected price,  and  using  censored regression  models to  estimate  the complying  and
2All years in the period  1966-92, except  1973-77,  and 1980-81.
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program-planted  acreage  because  there was  no program participation  decision in  several
years.
An Econometric Model for Acreage Responses
In the presence  of a voluntary  government program,  an expected profit-maximizing  crop
farmer allocates  acres among competing crops and conservation uses by maximizing (Lee
and Helmberger; Morzuch, Weaver, and Helmberger)
(1)  H = EP w qNPA  + EP'(qs  #A,)+  WSPqpPAw + PdA  -c'x  - TFC,
where n  is expected profit; EP W is the expected price of wheat; qw is the expected yield for
wheat; NPA W is nonprogram-planted acres of wheat; EPs is a vector of expected prices for
substitute crops; q,  is a vector of expected yields for substitute crops; A,  is a vector of acres
for substitute  crops; the  symbol # denotes  element-by-element  multiplication;  WSP is the
government's wheat support or target price; qp  the government's program yield for wheat;
PAw is program-planted acres of wheat; Pd is the government's  payment for diverting  acres
to conservation uses; Ad is acres diverted to conservation uses; c is a vector of variable input
prices; x is a vector of variable  input levels;  and TFC is total fixed costs. In order to focus
on price effects  and  limit the number  of independent  variables,  the econometric  model
considers  only  one substitute  crop  for each  region and  ignores the variable  input levels.
Following Chavas and Holt, risk-averse farmers maximize expected utility. The econometric
model assumes that the expected utility function of wheat farmers is a function of  both profit,
as defined in equation (1),  and the variance of market wheat price.
Farmers with acres eligible for the wheat program (henceforth called base acres)3 have
three options: (a) participate in the program, (b) plant wheat outside the program, or (c) plant
a substitute crop. Program participation is defined here as agreeing not to plant wheat on the
required percentage of base acres in order to qualify for receiving the support or target price
for that year. In some years, program participation also allowed farmers to divert additional
acres in exchange for diversion payments.
The choice among the three  options is determined by their relative expected profit and
relative  risk.  Program  compliance  (CAr)  is encouraged by a  high support  or target price
(WSP)  and an attractive, optional paid land-diversion payment (DPt). Conversely, whenever
expected  market  prices  for  wheat  (EPtw) or  substitute  crops  (EP,)  are  high,  program
participation  will  be  discouraged.  Program  participation  among  risk-averse  farmers  is
encouraged  by high uncertainty (Re)  about the expected market price, because  the support
or target price  received by program participants  is known at planting time.  Furthermore,
whenever  these parameters  favor program participation,  the number of complying  acres
depends  on the number  of eligible base  acres  (BA). Therefore,  the equation  for program
complying acres is
(2)  CAt  = fc(EPt,  EPs, R.,  WSIP,  BA,  DPt,et).
3Acres eligible for government programs have been labeled "allotment acres" from  1961-77, "program acres" from  1977-81,
and "base acres" from  1982 to the present.
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Following the Chembezi and Womack model, wheat acres planted by farmers participat-
ing in the government program (PA,) are essentially fixed by the number of program-com-
plying acres (CAt) and the required acreage set-aside provisions  (ARPt), unless an optional
acreage  diversion payment  (DP,) is offered that year. An exception  is the wheat program
from 1971 to 1973, in which marketing certificates  were only paid for wheat produced on a
small "domestic  allotment"  acreage, but participating  farmers were able to plant wheat  on
more than the "domestic allotment" acres. An intercept shift variable  (D7173,)  accounts for
this  change  in the  base  acre  definition.  Participating  farmers  may fallow  more than the
required  number of acres or may plant nonprogram crops on acres that are  not part of the
set-aside, but this can reduce their future base acres. A high support or target price (WSP,)
encourages participating farmers to plant all eligible acres to wheat. Therefore, the equation
for program-planted acres is
(3)  PAt = fp(WSPt, CAt, ARPt, DP, D7173t ,  e 2 t).
For farmers  who do not participate  in the government program,  planted wheat acreage
(NPAt)  is  encouraged  by  a high  expected  wheat price  (EPt)  and  discouraged  by high
expected prices  for competing crops  (EPt). Risk-averse  farmers also will be discouraged
from planting  wheat by high uncertainty  (R,)  about the expected wheat price.  Since the
number of acres  that  are  well adapted  to  wheat production  is finite,  a high  number  of
program-complying  acres  (CAt)  reduces  the  number  of nonprogram  wheat  acres.  The
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), begun in 1986, also has removed many acres from
wheat production,  thereby  reducing  nonprogram-planted  acres.  However,  the sudden  in-
crease  in wheat prices in  1973 encouraged  many farmers to cultivate  additional cropland
acres, which shifted the intercept for nonprogram wheat acres for years after 1973 (SHIFT,):
(4)  NPA  = fN(EPt w, EPts, R,  CA,  CRP, SHIFT, e3t)
There  were no government  program participation  decisions in  1974-77  and  1980-81
because there were no allotment or set-aside requirements in those years. The program-com-
plying acres (CA,) and program-planted acres (PAt) variables are therefore censored at zero
in these six years. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are biased in this  case (Tobin).
Consistent estimates can be obtained using the tobit model, which is specified as
(5)  Y (5)  ={XP'+e,  ifXt'3+ et >O, and
t-0[ ] 0  + otherwise,
where  Yt is the dependent variable;  Xt  is a vector of explanatory variables;  is a vector of
unknown  parameters;  and  e,  is  a random  error term  which  is  assumed  independently,
normally distributed with mean zero and variance c
2. In the tobit model, the expected value
of the dependent variable is
E(Y,)  = Xtp F(z)+  f (z),
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where  X,'  /la,f(z) is  the  normal  probability  density  function,  and F(z) is the  normal
cumulative density function.
Data and Procedure
Price and planted-acreage  data for  1965-92 were obtained from various issues of Agricul-
tural Statistics (USDA). Wheat base acres  and program-planted acres data were obtained
from James Langley at USDA-ASCS.  Regional values for these variables were calculated
by weighting state  values by their wheat production  in  each year. The  support price  was
multiplied by one minus the proportion of acres required to be placed in set-aside or acreage
reduction in order to qualify for the support price. The support price for 1991 and  1992 was
also multiplied by 0.85, the proportion of acres qualifying  for deficiency  payments under
normal flex acreage provisions. All prices are deflated by the Index of Prices Paid by Farmers
for Production (USDA).
The expected market prices are assumed to equal a weighted average of the average price
received by farmers for the previous three years, where the weights are 0.50 for the previous
year (t-l), 0.33 for two years before (t-2), and 0.17 for three years before (t-3).4 The price
risk variable used in the model is the weighted variance  of prices received  in the previous
three years around the expected prices in those years. The weights  are the same  as for the
expected prices:  0.50 for the previous year (t-1), 0.33 for two years before (t-2), and 0.17
for three years before (t-3). The weights and calculation  procedure  are the same  as those
used by Chavas and Holt.
Because the complying-acres  variable  used in the program-planted acre and nonpro-
gram-planted acre equations is endogenous, (3) and (4) were estimated using an instrumental
variable for complying acres.  The complying-acres estimate determined by (2) was used as
the  instrumental variable  for equation  (3)  since  it meets the criterion  of zero correlation
between  the instrumental  variable  and the residuals  of (3).  Zero correlation  between the
instrumental  variable  and  the  residuals  of (4) was  not obtained  by any instrument  that
included expected market prices. An acceptable  instrumental variable  for complying acres
in (4) was obtained by estimating complying acres as  a function of wheat base acres, the
wheat support price  (set to zero for those years with no participation decision), the optional
diversion payment,  and lagged complying acres.
Complying  acres  and program-planted  acres  were  estimated  with the tobit model  for
censored data in the LIMDEP econometrics  software package (Greene). Nonprogram acres
in the northern plains, central plains, and southern  plains were estimated with LIMDEP's
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator for seemingly unrelated regressions.  The LIM-
DEP procedure for estimating individual  equation autocorrelation  coefficients  and re-esti-
mating -the  system of equations was employed. Nonprogram acres in the United States were
estimated using  the  maximum likelihood  estimator  of Beach  and MacKinnon  as imple-
mented in LIMDEP (Greene)  in order to correct for first-order autocorrelation.
4This is the weighting scheme used by Chavas and Holt. Alternative weighting schemes were used to evaluate the sensitivity
of the  results obtained  to the specification  of expected  prices. The  alternative weights used were (1, 0, 0),  (0.8,  0.15,  0.05).
(0.7, 0.2, 0.1),  (0.5,  0.3, 0.2),  and  (0.33,  0.33, 0.33).  The chosen weighting scheme produced higher log-likelihood and R
measures for most of the estimates. Signs and statistical significance levels for government program variables were not affected
by alternative  weights.  The statistical significance  and elasticities for price  and risk variables are sometimes  affected by the
use of alternative  weights.
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Because the  program-planted  acreage  and nonprogram-planted  acreage  equations  in-
clude a complying-acre  variable  and complying acres are  a function of several prices (1),
elasticities of acreage  response to prices for these equations  include the indirect influences
of prices acting through the complying-acreage  variable. Dropping the time subscripts, the
total elasticities for program-planted  acreage responses,  including both direct and indirect
price effects, are as follows:
F  PA  aCA  P1M
(7)  RPM=  acA  ap  P-A  and
8PA  aC  A  8P  A
~(8)  R  P_  8PA  aPA  aCA  P_
aPM  CA  &PJ  PA'
where  EPM  is elasticity of program-planted  acreage to market prices or price  risk, 5P  is
elasticity of program-planted  acreage to the government support price,  PM is market price
or price risk, and PG is the government support price. The total elasticities for nonprogram-
planted acreage responses are as follows:
(9)  -NM  [P  +  P  'and
aNPA  ACA  PG
(10)  S
NG  [aCA  aP^j  NPA'
where  NM  is elasticity of nonprogram-planted  acreage to market prices  or price risk, and
NGC is  elasticity  of nonprogram-planted  acreage  to  the  government  support  price.  All
elasticities are calculated  at the means.
Results and Discussion
The estimated  coefficients  for  wheat program-complying  acreage  confirm that  program
participation  rises with increases  in support prices and falls when wheat market prices rise
(table  1).  When support prices  are  high relative to expected market  prices, farmers  plant
wheat under the government program in order to qualify for the support price. Coefficients
for the wheat support price are statistically significant  at a  1%  level for all regions and the
United States. Coefficients for the expected market price of wheat are statistically significant
at a 1% level for the central and southern plains, but only significant at a  10%  level for the
northern  plains and United States.  Price risk increases  wheat program compliance  in each
of the regions and the United States.  This suggests  that farmers are more inclined to plant
wheat under the government program when market prices are highly variable because then
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Table 1.  Tobit Estimates of Wheat Program-Complying Acreage by Region:  1966-92
Plains  United
Variables  Northern  Central  Southern  States
Intercept  4525.1  4900.3  5184.8  44101
Pw  -4729.8  -6538.4  -3286.0  -14005
(1.68)  (2.91)  (2.62)  (1.69)
Pbe  -2584.7
(0.63)
Pse  -3867.9  -2925.6  -28555
(1.35)  (2.02)  (3.00)
RISK  696.8  5782.9  4325.5  13072
(0.90)  (5.07)  (4.76)  (3.48)
WSP  2452.5  3484.2  1874.5  10914
(3.34)  (6.08)  (5.03)  (5.18)
BASE  1.0177  1.0687  0.8429  0.7547
(0.70)  (10.95)  (6.62)  (8.21)
DP  558.70  432.44  656.47  4102.6
(1.10)  (0.82)  (2.46)  (2.61)
SD of residuals  1347.5  1472.7  797.3  4351.9
aThe values in parentheses are t-statistics.
Notes:  Pwe = expected  price of wheat in  $/bu.; Pbe = expected  price  of barley;  Pse = expected price  of sorghum;  RISK =
weighted variance around expected  prices over previous  three years; BASE = wheat base acres  (1000 acres);  WSP = support
price or target price  for wheat, adjusted for acreage  reduction programs, acreage set-aside, and normal  flex acres provisions;
and DP  = optional land-diversion  payment.
they receive a certain support price. The price risk effect is statistically significant at a 1%
level for the United States and all regions except the northern plains.
The expected  market  prices  of barley  and  sorghum  have negative,  but  insignificant,
effects  on program  compliance  in the  northern  or central  plains.  However,  the  level  of
statistical significance of the negative  sorghum price effect on program compliance is 5%
in the  southern plains and  1%  in the United  States.  The differences  between the regional
price effects suggest that most wheat farmers in the northern and central plains are strongly
committed  to  growing  wheat  under the  government  program each  year,  but that  wheat
farmers in the southern plains and elsewhere in the United States consider sorghum (or corn,
whose price is highly correlated with the sorghum price) to be a good substitute crop.
As  expected,  program-complying  acreage  is positively  and  strongly correlated  with
wheat  base  acres.  This  reflects  the  high  rates  of program  participation  whenever  the
government programs are in effect and the zero values for both base acres and complying
acres  whenever there  is no acreage  set-aside  or reduction  program.  Program-complying
acreage is also positively correlated with the magnitude of  optional land-diversion payments.
The optional land-diversion programs provide an additional incentive to participate  in the
government  program,  but this  incentive  is  small (the maximum  elasticity of complying
acreage  response to diversion payments is 0.033).
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Table 2.  Tobit Estimates of Program-Complying Acreage  by Region:  1966-92
Plains  United
Variables  Northern  Central  Southern  States
Intercept  -4297.6  -3746.8  -2418.9  -19031
WSP  1297.8  988.23  731.59  6112.9
(2.37)a  (1.90)  (2.16)  (4.13)
CA(1-ARP)  1.0073  1.0213  0.9410  0.8188
(12.11)  (9.19)  (8.71)  (11.62)
DP  -1066.4  -35.29  -467.52  4599.3
(1.33)  (0.05)  (0.90)  (2.06)
D7173  8024.7  6983.3  3410.9  19675
(3.99)  (3.37)  (2.62)  (3.53)
SD of residuals  2560.3  2490.0  1638.0  7016.3
aThe values in parentheses  are t-statistics.
Notes:  WSP = support price or target price for wheat, adjusted for acreage reduction programs, acreage set-aside,  and normal
flex acres provisions; CA = complying wheat program acres; ARP = proportion of complying acres that must be set-aside  under
acreage  reduction  program or  set-aside provisions;  DP = optional land-diversion  payment;  and D7173 = dummy  variable,
equals one for 1971-73.
Table 3.  Estimates of Nonprogram Wheat Acreage  by Regions:  1966-92
Plains  United
Variables  Northern  Central  Southern  States
Intercept  432.0  -1175.0  -1747.8  -6053.7
Pwe  3152.8  7391.1  5045.4  38225
(1.93)a  (4.09)  (4.31)  (4.12)
Pbe  -164.73
(0.06)
Pse  -5034.5  -2983.1  -32085
(1.43)  (1.21)  (1.79)
RISK  -1513.8  -2789.1  -3460.7  -12766
(3.28)  (4.02)  (4.78)  (4.12)
CA  -0.7299  - 0.5225  -0.4241  -0.5232
(10.39)  (5.81)  (4.11)  (5.20)
CRP  -0.3590  -2.0276  -1.0075  -1.2644
(0.70)  (3.24)  (1.86)  (1.97)
SHIFT  15396  10755  9521.8  40859
(12.59)  (11.46)  (16.98)  (8.79)
SD of residuals  1983.4  1953.4  1242.3  8128.6
R
2 0.95  0.92  0.92  0.93
aThe values  in parentheses  are t-statistics.
Notes:  Pwe = expected  price  of wheat  in  $/bu.;  Pbe = expected  price of barley; Pse = expected price  of sorghum; RISK =
weighted  variance  around  expected  prices over previous  three  years;  CA  = complying  wheat program  acres;  CRP = acres
enrolled in  Conservation Reserve  Program (1,000 acres); and SHIFT=  dummy  variable, equals one after  1973.
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Program-planted  acres have an extremely strong positive correlation with complying acres
adjusted  for acreage  reduction  or set-aside  requirements  (table  2).  The  expected positive
correlation between the wheat support price and program-planted acres  is also confirmed.
The optional  paid land-diversion  payment  has the expected  negative  effect  on program-
planted acreage, but the effect is only statistically significant for the United States.
Price and risk effects  are generally opposite for nonprogram-planted  acreage than for
program-complying  acreage. The expected wheat price has the expected positive  influence
on nonprogram-planted  acreage in every region and the United States (table 3).  Price  risk
has a highly significant, negative effect on nonprogram-planted  acreage in every region and
the United States.
Expected prices for substitute crops have negative effects on nonprogram-planted acre-
age in all of the regions and the United States, but most of  these results are not statistically
significant. High levels of positive correlation between expected wheat and substitute price
variables may be partly responsible for the weak effects in the regional estimates. Correlation
coefficients between the expected prices  for substitute  crops and wheat range from 0.95 to
0.97.
Wheat  program-complying  acreage  has  a  highly  significant,  negative  influence  on
nonprogram  acres  because  acres  put  into the  government  program  are  not available  for
nonprogram wheat  planting.  The magnitude of the wheat base acreage effect  is highest in
the northern plains,  where the expected price  effect  is weakest.  The strong positive effect
for the intercept shift variable  reflects the expansion of wheat acreage in response to large
increases in wheat exports and prices in 1972 and 1973. The Conservation Reserve Program
has the expected negative effect on nonprogram-planted acres.
The  estimated  elasticities  of program-complying  acreage  response  to  wheat  support
prices range  from 0.53 for the northern plains to 0.98 for the central plains (table 4). The
estimated  elasticity of 0.53  for  the northern plains  is only slightly higher  than the 0.414
elasticity for  the northern plains reported  by Chembezi and Womack.  Elasticities of pro-
gram-planted acreage responses to wheat support price range from 0.90 in the northern plains
to 1.28 in the central plains. The elasticities of nonprogram acreage response to wheat support
price range from -0.26 in the southern plains to -0.64 in the northern  plains. The northern
plains estimate for the program-planted  acreage elasticity  is substantially higher than  the
0.461 reported by Chembezi and Womack. The northern plains estimate for the nonprogram
acreage  elasticity is much lower than the -1.383 reported by Chembezi and Womack.
The estimated  elasticities  of program-complying  acreage response  to  expected wheat
prices range from -0.95 in the northern plains to -1.59 in the central plains (table 4). Again,
the northern plains elasticity is substantially greater than the -0.319 estimated by Chembezi
and  Womack.  Considering  both  the  wheat  price  effect  on  complying  acreage  and  the
complying  acreage  effect  on  program-planted  acreage  results  in  elasticities  of program-
planted acreage response to expected wheat price that range from - 0.88 for the United States
and -1.07  for the northern plains to -1.63  for the central  plains.  Chembezi and Womack's
estimate for this elasticity  in the northern plains is -0.234.  Possible reasons for this large
gap  in elasticity estimates include:  (a) Chembezi  and Womack's  omission of a price  risk
variable,  and  (b)  Chembezi  and  Womack's  use  of a  one-year  lagged  price  to  represent
expected price. The risk variables exhibit high correlation with the expected price variables,
with correlation  coefficients ranging from 0.70 to 0.81.  Since the risk variable  has statisti-
cally significant  effects  on wheat  acreage that are  opposite in sign to the expected wheat
price effects,  analyses that ignore risk tend to understate the expected wheat price effect.
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Table 4.  Elasticities of Wheat Acreage  Response  by Regions:  1966-92
Prices  Support
Regions  Wheat  Barley  Sorghum  Risk  Price
Program-Complying  Acreage Elasticities
Northern Plainsa  - 0.952  - 0.317  0.048  0.527*
Central Plains  -1.595  - 0.657  0.319  0.983
Southern Plains  -1.183***  - 0.770**  0.267***  0.764***
United States  - 0.932*  -1.310**  0.200**  0.808*
Program-Planted  Acreage Elasticitiesb
Northern Plains  -1.071  - 0.357  0.054  0.904**
Central  Plains  -1.629  - 0.671  0.326  1.282*
Southern  Plains  -1.289  - 0.770  0.291  1.179**
United States  - 0.889  -1.250  0.191  1.247**
Nonprogram-Planted  Acreage Elasticitiesb
Northern Plains  2.392*  0.380  - 0.248***  - 0.691
Central Plains  3.818*  - 0.741  - 0.464  - 0.743
Southern Plains  2.407  - 0.476  - 0.339  - 0.337
United States  3.557*  - 0.923  - 0.352*  - 0.496
aThe  northern  plains  include  North  Dakota,  South Dakota,  Minnesota,  and  Montana.  The central  plains  include  Kansas,
Nebraska, Colorado,  and Wyoming. The southern plains include Oklahoma and Texas.
Including the indirect  effects on complying acreage and the complying acreage effect.
Notes:  denotes  statistical significance  of the direct  effect at the  1%  level,  denotes statistical  significance of the direct
effect at the 5% level,  and  denotes  statistical significance of the direct effect at the 10%  level.
The estimated  elasticities  of direct  nonprogram  acreage  response  to  expected  wheat
market prices range from  1.14 in the northern plains to 2.61  in the central plains and 2.98
for the United  States.  The total  elasticities  of nonprogram  acreage  response  to expected
wheat price suggested by Chembezi  and Womack also consider the effects of the expected
wheat price on complying acres (negative) and the complying acres' effect on nonprogram
acres (negative).These  total elasticities of nonprogram acreage response to expected wheat
price range from 2.39 for the northern plains to 3.82 for the central plains, and 3.56 for the
United  States  (table 4).  The total elasticity of nonprogram  acreage  response  to expected
wheat price reported by Chembezi and Womack for the northern plains is a much lower 1.52.
Elasticities  of program-complying  acreage  response,  program-planted  acreage,  and
nonprogram acreage response to risk are small in all regions and the United States (table 4).
In each of the regions  and the United States the program-planted acreage responses to risk
and the nonprogram acreage responses to risk have opposite signs. As a result, the elasticity
of total planted wheat acreage response to risk5 is very close to zero in every region. The
elasticity of total planted acreage response to risk ranges from -0.062 in the northern plains
to 0.003 in the central plains, and is -0.018 for the United States. These estimated elasticities
of total planted wheat acreage response  to risk are very close to the long-run income risk
5Calculated  as the weighted average of elasticities  for program-planted  and nonprogram  acres, where  the weights equal the
ratios of mean program-planted acres and mean nonprogram-planted  acres to total acres.
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elasticities  range of  - 0.009  to - 0.059 reported by  Brorsen,  Chavas,  and Grant for rice
acreage and the own-revenue risk elasticities of 0.020 and -0.087 reported by Chavas and
Holt for corn and soybean acreage, respectively.
These results, like those of previous studies, indicate that wheat acreage supply responses
vary  across regions.  The elasticities  of program-complying  and program-planted  acreage
response to support price are weakest in the northern plains. The elasticities of complying
acreage response to the expected wheat price, expected substitute  crop price, and price risk
also are weaker in the northern plains than in the central or southern plains. The relatively
weak response of complying acreage to prices in the northern plains suggests that northern
plains wheat farmers are the most dependent on the government programs and the least likely
to leave those programs as program  parameters  or market prices change. The elasticity of
nonprogram-planted  acreage  response  to the expected wheat price  also  is weakest in the
northern plains.  Together,  these  results  suggest  that northern  plains  wheat  farmers  have
relatively few attractive alternatives to growing wheat. Responses to expected market prices
are  highest  for the  central  plains  and  United  States,  in which  there  are  more  attractive
substitute crops.
Conclusions
The most significant  finding of this study is that expected price and price risk have very
different effects on program-complying  acreage than on nonprogram-planted  acreage.  The
expected wheat price has a strong negative  effect on program-complying  acreage and has a
strong positive effect on nonprogram-planted acreage. Furthermore, the wheat support price
has  a  positive  effect  on  program-complying  and  program-planted  wheat  acreage,  but a
negative, indirect effect on nonprogram-planted acreage. Price risk increases program-com-
plying acreage but reduces nonprogram-planted acreage. The net effect of  price risk on total
planted  acres  is  small.  However,  omitting  risk  variables  from  acreage  supply  response
models may bias estimates for the own-expected price effects, because  expected price and
risk often are positively correlated but have statistically significant and opposite effects on
program-complying  and  nonprogram-planted  wheat  acreage.  The  significant  price  risk
effects also suggest that the predictability of support prices may be just as important to wheat
farmers as the support price levels.
The determinants  of wheat acreage also vary by region.  Program-complying  and  pro-
gram-planted acreage  in the northern plains are less responsive to changes in support price
and expected market prices than in other regions.  Price risk also has the weakest effects on
northern plains program-complying acreage.  The response of nonprogram-planted  acreage
to the expected wheat price also is weakest in the northern plains. These results suggest that
wheat producers in the central plains, southern plains, and elsewhere  in the United States
have better opportunities to substitute other crops for wheat than do producers in the northern
plains.  Policy analyses  must consider these regional differences  in order to make reliable
predictions of how changes  in government program parameters  or trade policies will affect
wheat acreage.
Previous analyses of wheat acreage responses have obtained a wide range of results partly
because  they  used  different  schemes  for  combining  market  variables  with  government
program  variables  to  estimate  total  planted  acreage.  Since  expected  market  prices  and
government  support prices have opposite effects on program-planted  acreage, the ways in
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which expected  market prices  and government  support prices  have been  combined have
largely  determined  the  estimated  responses  of total  acreage  to  a  single  price  variable.
Separating  the estimation of program-planted  acreage  from nonprogram acreage  removes
some  biases  introduced by model  specification  and  clarifies  the economic  relationships.
Separating the estimation of program-compliance  from  the estimation of planted  acreage
provides additional information about program participation  decisions and further clarifies
the economic relationships. Future wheat acreage supply analyses should endeavor to refine
the  specifications of price variables  and government  program parameters within separate
complying-acreage,  program-planted acreage,  and nonprogram acreage models.
[Received  August 1994; final version received March 1995.]
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